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ARBITRATING ARBITRABILITY: 
HOW THE U.S. SUPREME COURT  
EMPOWERED THE ARBITRATOR AT THE 
EXPENSE OF THE JUDGE AND THE 
AVERAGE JOE 
Jennifer Schulz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, the use of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses has grown exponentially. These clauses permeate 
the economy: they appear in contracts with cell phone providers, 
credit card companies, employers, and even nursing homes.1 In its 
recent ruling in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,2 the U.S. 
Supreme Court created new obstacles for plaintiffs seeking to bring 
claims to court when an arbitration agreement is involved. Prior to 
this decision, the party seeking to compel arbitration bore the burden 
of establishing that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. Now the 
party looking to go to court has the burden of proving the arbitration 
agreement invalid—a seemingly impossible task given the Court’s 
new requirements. 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S. Architecture 2004, University of 
Virginia. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for 
their hard work on this Comment and the Supreme Court issue. I owe my gratitude to Professor 
David Horton for his guidance and support in writing this Comment. Special thanks go to Elena 
DeCoste Grieco, Kristin Olin, and Jeff Payne—for everything. Finally, I would like to thank my 
family for all their support. 
 1. See Mark Thomsen, Companies Sneaky with Arbitration Clause, COULEE NEWS (Sept. 9, 
2009, 12:00 AM), http://lacrossetribune.com/couleenews/news/opinion/article_2458168e-8c24-
5098-945f-b26ed3594b21.html. In 2007, 40 percent of the 45 million members of the nonunion 
workforce were working under employment contracts calling for arbitration. David Lewin, 
Workplace ADR: What’s New and What Matters?, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE 
FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 23, 27 (Stephen F. Befort & Patrick Halter eds., 2007). 
Interestingly, consumers are never subject to mandatory pre-dispute binding arbitration outside of 
the United States; in fact, the European Union would probably prohibit such a practice. EDWARD 
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 138–40 (2006). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
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The arbitration agreement in Rent-a-Center included a provision 
granting the arbitrator authority to decide all issues, including those 
relating to the arbitration procedures and to the agreement’s validity.3 
These issues are about the claim’s arbitrability—that is, whether the 
parties agreed that a particular claim would be subject to arbitration.4 
The ruling makes it even harder for the Average Joe to bring his case 
before an impartial judge or a jury of his peers. For the average 
American, whose only familiarity with the judicial process probably 
comes from television shows like Law & Order, mandatory 
arbitration is an unpleasant surprise. Most Americans’ fundamental 
comprehension of the U.S. legal system includes the right to a jury of 
their peers. 
This Comment argues that the Court’s ruling will negatively 
affect the rights of ordinary Americans and that Congress needs to 
amend the eighty-six-year-old Federal Arbitration Act5 (FAA or “the 
Act”)—or otherwise step in to prevent businesses from using their 
superior bargaining power to take advantage of employees and 
consumers.6 Part I of this Comment lays out the historical framework 
of arbitration in the United States. Part II describes Rent-a-Center’s 
facts and its path to the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the Court’s 
holding and the reasoning behind it. Part IV analyzes the decision 
and proposes that Congress amend the FAA. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT 
ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE 
In the early twentieth century, federal judges commonly treated 
arbitration clauses as revocable at will7 and generally would not 
 
 3. Id. at 2777. 
 4. “Arbitrability generally deals with the question of whether parties have agreed to 
arbitrate a dispute, the scope of that agreement, and the more ‘arcane’ question of who decides 
those two issues.” Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of 
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. 
REV. 819, 828 (2003). 
 5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006). 
 6. Congress has not amended the FAA to keep up with the Court’s decisions. See Richard 
A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2009). 
 7. See Andre V. Egle, Comment, Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration 
Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2003). 
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order specific performance of arbitration agreements.8 In 1925, 
Congress enacted what is now the FAA in response to the federal 
courts’ reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements.9 Congress 
indicated that the purpose of the FAA was to promote a federal 
policy of encouraging arbitration, thereby helping businesses reduce 
expense and delay when resolving disputes.10 To that end, the FAA 
requires judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements.11 Through 
section 2 of the FAA (“section 2”), Congress declared arbitration 
contracts to be on “the same footing as other contracts.”12 After the 
FAA passed, courts treated arbitration clauses as valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable unless there were some ground for revocation that 
would apply to any contract.13 Section 2 thus prevented courts from 
treating arbitration clauses as a special category of contracts subject 
to a different set of rules. 
Forty years after Congress passed the FAA, the Supreme Court 
made its first major decision under the Act. In Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,14 the Supreme Court had to 
decide “whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire 
contract is to be resolved by the federal court, or . . . referred to the 
arbitrators.”15 The Court read section 4 of the FAA (“section 4”) to 
provide an “explicit answer”: 
[T]he federal court is instructed [by section 4] to order 
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that the “making of 
the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue.” 
 
 8. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 36. They would, however, award damages for breach. 
Id. 
 9. Peter Feuille & Michael H. LeRoy, Where Is the New Enterprise Wheel? Judicial Review 
of Employment Arbitration Awards, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 339, 348. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 349. 
 12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, 
at 2 (1924)). Section 2 states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 13. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 14. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 15. Id. at 402. 
  
1272           LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1269 
Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the 
arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the 
“making” of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court 
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language 
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud 
in the inducement of the contract generally.16 
The Court treated the arbitration clause at issue as though it were 
separate from the “container” contract of which it was a part.17 This 
interpretation confirmed the separability doctrine, a legal fiction that 
the parties formed two contracts: the container contract and a second 
contract consisting of just the arbitration clause.18 This second 
contract often calls for arbitration of issues regarding the validity of 
its container contract, thus granting power to the arbitrator to decide 
the merits of whether the container contract is enforceable.19 
Nearly thirty years later, the Court used a seemingly different 
standard in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan:20 there, the 
Court decided that an arbitrator—rather than a judge—would decide 
whether the parties agreed to arbitration only where “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence demonstrates that both parties agreed to 
arbitrate arbitrability.21 The Court reasoned that the general  
presumption in favor of arbitration should give way in cases in which 
permitting an arbitrator to determine arbitrability might “too often 
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would 
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.”22 
 
 16. Id. at 403–04. 
 17. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 109 (2007). 
 18. Id. Although some courts use the term “severability” instead of “separability,” the two 
are basically interchangeable. For consistency, this Comment will use the term “separability.” 
 19. See id. at 109–10. According to Justice Black’s vigorous dissent, the FAA is clear in its 
intent that an arbitration agreement should be enforced unless the court—not the arbitrator—finds 
grounds for its revocation. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 20. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). The Court laid out the parties’ disagreements this way: 
First, the Kaplans and First Options disagree about whether the Kaplans are personally 
liable for [their company]’s debt to First Options. That disagreement makes up the 
merits of the dispute. Second, they disagree about whether they agreed to arbitrate the 
merits. That disagreement is about the arbitrability of the dispute. Third, they disagree 
about who should have the primary power to decide the [arbitrability]. 
Id. at 942. 
 21. Id. at 944. 
 22. Id. at 945. The Court indicated that this difference was important because parties 
contracting for arbitration have likely given some thought to the scope of arbitration but might 
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Prior to Rent-a-Center, the most recent case on the issue of 
arbitrability was Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.23 The 
Court distinguished between a challenge to the arbitration agreement 
specifically (which goes to the court) and a challenge to the contract 
as a whole (which goes to the arbitrator).24 In Buckeye, the contracts’ 
identical arbitration provisions were separable under Prima Paint 
and therefore enforceable apart from the remainder of the contracts, 
even if the contracts as a whole were found to be void.25 The 
plaintiffs should have specifically challenged the arbitration clause if 
they wanted a court to hear their claims. 
As a result of these decisions, when Rent-a-Center came before 
the Court in 2010, there seemed to be two distinct methods of 
determining arbitrability claims. Under Prima Paint and Buckeye, the 
presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses requires the 
plaintiff to expressly challenge the validity of the arbitration 
agreement itself before a court will hear the case. First Options, 
however, has the opposite presumption—one against arbitrating 
arbitrability—and requires the court to determine whether the party 
wishing to compel arbitration has shown clear and unmistakable 
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate. In Rent-a-Center, the 
Court resolved the conflict created by these cases. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Antonio Jackson (“Jackson”), an African American man, 
worked for Rent-a-Center West, Inc. (RAC) in Reno, Nevada.26 Like 
many corporations, RAC required that each of its employees agree to 
 
not realize the significance of having an arbitrator determine the scope of his own power. Id. 
  The Court further defined its exception to the general federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). There, the Court 
explained that when “questions of arbitrability” reference the gateway matter of whether the 
parties actually agreed to arbitrate (e.g., whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration 
clause), the questions go to the court. Id. at 83–84. In instances in which the parties would likely 
expect the arbitrator to decide the issue, such as whether a claim has been waived or whether a 
condition precedent to arbitration has been fulfilled, the question goes to the arbitrator. Id. at 84. 
 23. 546 U.S. 440 (2006). This was a class action suit against a payday lender for using 
illegal practices that would render its agreements with the plaintiffs invalid. Id. at 443. 
 24. Id. at 444, 449. 
 25. Id. at 446. 
 26. Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 1, 3, Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West, Inc., No. 03:07-
CV-0050-LRH, 2007 WL 7030394 (D. Nev. June 7, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
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arbitrate all disputes,27 and Jackson signed RAC’s Mutual Agreement 
to Arbitrate Claims (“the Agreement”) on the day he was hired.28 The 
Agreement stated that RAC and Jackson consented to arbitrate all 
past, present, and future claims, including discrimination claims, and 
gave the arbitrator exclusive authority to resolve disputes regarding 
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of the 
Agreement.29 
During his employment with RAC, Jackson sought promotions 
on multiple occasions, but RAC repeatedly denied him.30 RAC 
instead promoted non–African American employees with less 
seniority than Jackson.31 Jackson filed a complaint for racial 
discrimination and retaliation in federal court.32 RAC moved to 
dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration, arguing that the 
Agreement precluded him from pursuing his claims in court;33 in 
response, Jackson argued that the Agreement was unconscionable 
and therefore unenforceable.34 The district court granted RAC’s 
motion:35 because Jackson had challenged the Agreement as a whole, 
the question of arbitrability was for the arbitrator and not the court.36 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate 
arbitrability is for the court—not the arbitrator—to decide, even if 
the contract delegates that determination to the arbitrator.37 The court 
 
 27. Declaration of Steven A. Spratt at ¶ 3, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394 (No. 03:07-
CV-0050-LRH), 2010 WL 723713 at *27. 
 28. Respondent Antonio Jackson’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 
Rent-a-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497). 
 29. Rent-a-Center, Inc. Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims, Exhibit 1 Attached to 
Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394 (No. 
3:07-CV-0050-LRH), 2010 WL 723713 at *29–34. 
 30. Complaint, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 5–6. 
 31. Id. at ¶ 6. Jackson was promoted eventually, only to be terminated two months later. Id. 
at ¶ 11. 
 32. Id. at ¶¶ 14–20. 
 33. Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration at 2, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 
7030394 (No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH). 
 34. Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Attorney Fees at 2, Rent-a-Center, 
2007 WL 7030394 (No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH). 
 35. Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394, at *3. The court reasoned that the Agreement “clearly 
and unmistakenly [sic] provides the arbitrator with the exclusive authority to decide whether the 
Agreement to Arbitrate is enforceable.” Id. at *2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 
2772 (2010). 
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found it significant that the Agreement was not simply a clause 
within a larger container contract; rather, it was a freestanding 
agreement to arbitrate.38 The Ninth Circuit interpreted First Options 
as requiring courts to apply “ordinary state-law principles” in 
deciding whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.39 
Therefore, when “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as 
unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully 
assent to the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability 
is for the court.”40 
III.  THE COURT’S DECISION 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth 
Circuit, holding that because Jackson did not challenge the specific 
provision granting the arbitrator authority to resolve any dispute 
regarding the Agreement’s enforceability, the Court had to treat that 
provision as separable, rendering it valid and enforceable.41 
Therefore, the arbitrator could determine arbitrability—and, 
necessarily, his own jurisdiction.42 The majority43 framed the issue as 
whether the sentence stating that the arbitrator has exclusive 
authority to resolve disputes about the Agreement’s enforceability—
the “delegation provision”—was valid under section 2.44 
Under section 2, a party may challenge the validity of an 
arbitration agreement in two ways: either by specifically challenging 
the validity of the agreement to arbitrate or by challenging the 
contract as a whole.45 The Court stated that only the former allows a 
court to determine an arbitration agreement’s enforceability and that 
as a matter of federal law, an arbitration provision is separable.46 
 
 38. Id. at 915–16. 
 39. Id. at 917 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 2774. 
 44. Id. at 2778 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006)). 
This section requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, unless 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” invalidate 
the agreements. Id. at 2776 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 
(1996)). For the text of section 2, see supra note 12. 
 45. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 46. Id. (citing Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445). 
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Thus, a plaintiff must direct a challenge specifically at the agreement 
to arbitrate for a court to intervene; if a party challenges another 
contract provision or the contract as a whole, the court can enforce 
an agreement to arbitrate.47 The Court further explained that it was of 
no consequence that the entire contract was an arbitration agreement 
(rather than a contract unrelated to arbitration that merely included 
an arbitration clause)—the delegation provision was still separable 
from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.48 Because Jackson 
challenged the validity of the Agreement as a whole, an arbitrator, 
not a judge, had to hear his claim.49 
In one of his last written opinions, Justice Stevens dissented50 
and claimed that the majority’s “breezy assertion that the subject 
matter of the contract at issue—in this case, an arbitration agreement 
and nothing more—‘makes no difference’ . . . [was] simply wrong.”51 
He argued that certain issues—particularly those that the parties 
would likely expect a court to decide—remain within the province of 
judicial review even though the FAA allows parties to define the 
scope of arbitration agreements.52 Thus when parties have included a 
delegation provision, courts must decide whether that provision is 
valid.53 Justice Stevens concluded that questions of arbitrability 
should go to the arbitrator in only two circumstances: “(1) when the 
parties have demonstrated, clearly and unmistakably, that it is their 
intent to [send such questions to the arbitrator]; or (2) when the 
validity of an arbitration agreement depends exclusively on the 
validity of the [entire] substantive contract of which it is a part.”54 
Justice Stevens, therefore, would have relied on First Options55 
alone, as Jackson’s claim that the Agreement is unconscionable 
shows that he did not clearly or unmistakably intend to allow the 
arbitrator to determine arbitrability.56 By expanding the Prima Paint57 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2779. 
 49. Id. 
 50. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 2781–82. 
 52. Id. at 2782. 
 53. Id. at 2783. 
 54. Id. at 2784. 
 55. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 56. Id. 
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rule,58 however, the majority required Jackson to use greater 
specificity and challenge the exact sentence delegating such disputes 
to the arbitrator,59 even though in Jackson’s case, “any challenge to 
the contract itself [was] also, necessarily, a challenge to the 
arbitration agreement. They [were] one and the same.”60 
IV.  HOW THE COURT GOT IT WRONG 
To most Americans, the Court’s decision seems irrational—if a 
party did not agree to an arbitration agreement as a whole, how could 
he agree to any of the agreement’s provisions? There is a general 
sense that “[i]f an agreement to arbitrate is unfair, the arbitrator 
shouldn’t decide that question.”61 The Court’s decision is more than 
simply illogical, however. It follows neither the FAA nor Congress’s 
intent in enacting the FAA and Congress must act to reverse the 
Court’s ever-increasing embrace of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration.62 
A.  The Decision Does Not Follow the FAA 
The Court has “recast arbitration in an activist set of cases that 
largely ignore careful legislative history and even the explicit words 
of the FAA.”63 It is well settled that arbitration is a matter of 
contract,64 and arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as 
 
 57. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 58. It is interesting to note that this line of cases was not briefed by the parties or relied on 
by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 2785. In fact, even RAC itself suggested that the Court should follow 
First Options. Reply to Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Rent-a-Center, 130 S. 
Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497) (“In this case, First Options is front and center.”). 
 59. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2787. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Ameet Sachdev, High Court Sides with Businesses on Arbitration Case, CHI. TRIB., 
June 22, 2010, at C17 (quoting Karen Halverson Cross, professor at John Marshall Law School). 
 62. This Comment criticizes mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and 
employment contexts. Although liberally applying the FAA has effectively cleared dockets, 
consumer and employee claims constitute a disproportionate majority of the dismissed cases. 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 84 
(2007) (statement of David S. Schwartz, University of Wisconsin Law School) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements]. 
 63. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 64. In fact, this argument is used by those favoring the Court’s decision: a contract is an 
exercise of choice by the parties, and those who agree to use arbitration should not be allowed to 
go to court. Timothy Sandefur, Rent-a-Center v. Jackson: Supreme Court Upholds the Right to 
Contract for Arbitration, PLF LIBERTY BLOG (June 21, 2010, 7:46 AM), http://plf.typepad.com/ 
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other contracts—but not more so.65 Consequently, parties can 
certainly agree, as they often do, to resolve disputes through 
arbitration; they can even agree to have the arbitrator rule on his or 
her own jurisdiction. Jackson claimed, however, that forcing him to 
argue his dispute in front of an arbitrator required him to abide by an 
invalid contract. According to Prima Paint, Jackson needed only to 
allege that he did not agree to the arbitration clause.66 The Court 
required more of him, however, and in doing so, turned our 
constitutional tradition of access to the courts on its head.67 
1.  The Making of the Arbitration Agreement Was in Issue 
Unlike the Prima Paint contract—where the contract was a 
detailed expression of the parties’ entire understanding, and the 
agreement to arbitrate was only one clause68—the Rent-a-Center 
agreement to arbitrate was the entire contract. As the dissent argued, 
this fact should have made a difference in the Court’s analysis.69 
Section 4 requires courts to hear disputes if the making of the 
arbitration agreement is in issue.70 Jackson challenged the Agreement 
as unconscionable, a finding that depends on the circumstances at the 
 
plf/2010/06/rentacenter-v-jackson-supreme-court-upholds-the-right-to-contract-for-
arbitration.html. That, however, is exactly Jackson’s argument: he did not agree to arbitration. 
  Interestingly, although arbitration is a matter of contract, parties cannot contractually 
customize the legal standard of review for an arbitration award. See infra note 78. 
 65. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). The 
National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) argued that the rule creates a “federal 
common law rule of self-enforcement that applies only to arbitration clauses and overrides the 
state-law requirements applying to all other contracts,” thereby doing the opposite of the FAA’s 
intent of putting arbitration clauses on the same footing as other contracts. Brief of National 
Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Rent-a-
Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497) [hereinafter NACA Brief]. 
 66. The Agreement was just one piece of Jackson’s employment contract with RAC, and 
Jackson challenged only the Agreement. Respondent Antonio Jackson’s Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497). 
 67. See David H. Gans, Why the Supreme Court’s Decision in Rent-a-Center v. Jackson 
Matters, TEXT & HIST. BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1785. 
 68. Also, the contract in Prima Paint was between two businesses of arguably equal 
bargaining power, not between an employer and an employee. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 
397–98. 
 69. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2782. 
 70. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Prior to the Rent-a-Center decision, some commentators suggested 
that the only thing a party needed to do to put the “making” in issue was to invoke a contract 
defense like unconscionability. David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 8 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/ 
2010/04/02/horton.pdf. 
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time of contract formation.71 Therefore, in Jackson’s case, the 
“making of the agreement” was, in fact, in issue.72 Nevertheless, the 
Court found that because Jackson did not specifically challenge the 
delegation clause, the Agreement’s making was not in issue.73 This 
decision abolishes section 4’s judicial review requirement and 
essentially allows private parties to unilaterally alter substantive and 
procedural rights without meaningful state oversight.74 
2.  It Is Unclear If a Plaintiff Can Ever Make the Required Showing 
While section 2 indicates that arbitration clauses are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable” unless separate grounds to revoke the 
contract exist,75 the Court’s decision makes arbitration clauses 
enforceable notwithstanding possible grounds for revocation. The 
Court treated the Agreement between Jackson and RAC as if it had 
two discrete parts: the first required arbitration of all disputes, and 
the second required the arbitrator to decide any challenge to the 
Agreement’s validity. Essentially, the Court claimed that the fifty-
word delegation clause constituted a second agreement to which 
Jackson knowingly and willingly agreed even if he did not agree to 
the rest of the Agreement. 
This conclusion is hard to understand: by separating an 
agreement into a potential multitude of independent sentences—each 
allegedly agreed to on its own—rather than treating it as a whole, the 
Court read the FAA to “establish[] a near-bulletproof presumption of 
validity for all arbitration clauses.”76 This reading requires a party 
 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 72. One could argue that unconscionability does not involve the making of the agreement: 
unlike defenses such as duress that hinge on an inability to meaningfully assent to the making of 
the contract, unconscionability prohibits unfairness. 
 73. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 74. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 (2011). A 
delegation clause uses section 2 to trump another part of the FAA, section 4. Id. at 484. 
 75. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 76. Justice Scalia exploited the principle of separability to find that sub-arbitration 
agreements may be embedded within a larger arbitration agreement and that each of those 
embedded agreements are separable. This means that an aggrieved party must challenge each sub-
provision directly and individually. See James M. Gaitis, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson 
and the Ongoing Assault on Party Autonomy, KARL BAYER BLOG (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732. Holding the delegation clause enforceable even if the 
remainder of the arbitration agreement is unconscionable treats the agreement as a collection of 
separately enforceable mini-agreements, each individually considered and assented to by the 
parties. Justice Stevens’ dissent likened such a situation to a set of Russian nesting dolls. Rent-a-
Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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challenging a contract to prove that the delegation provision in and 
of itself is revocable, but how can one ever offer such proof for a 
single sentence taken out of context?77 By making it virtually 
impossible for parties to prove a delegation clause’s invalidity, Rent-
a-Center precludes parties from obtaining judicial review of 
arbitration clauses alleged to be unfair or unconscionable.78 
Companies now can (and likely will) insert similar language in 
employment agreements, secure in the knowledge that if an 
employee fails to challenge the delegation provision specifically, the 
employee will be compelled to arbitrate.79 With this change, access to 
the courts appears to be a privilege granted by an employer rather 
than a constitutionally guaranteed right. The Average Joe will 
increasingly find himself forced into arbitration even when he did not 
knowingly relinquish his right to judicial review. 
3.  The FAA Was Not Meant for Employment Contracts 
Not only does the Rent-a-Center Court’s decision not comply 
with sections 2 or 4, but it also does not comport with the FAA’s 
legislative history. Congress originally intended the FAA to protect 
the contractual decisions of commercial parties with similar 
 
 77. Courts often invalidate arbitration clauses due to infringement of substantive rights, but a 
delegation provision waives a procedural right (the right to have a judge hear the claim). Horton, 
supra note 74, at 468. In order for a plaintiff to prove that a delegation provision infringes on a 
substantive right, he must show not only that will it be harder for him to pursue his cause of 
action but also that the arbitrator will enforce the delegation provision, and courts are unlikely to 
engage in this amount of speculation. Id. Clearly, the additional showing a plaintiff must make 
dramatically increases his or her burden, and even Justice Scalia seemed to concede that if 
Jackson had challenged the “correct” part of the Agreement, he still probably would have lost. 
See id. at 467. 
 78. See id. When a court reviews an arbitral award, the arbitrator’s decision is entitled to 
deference even if that decision determines the validity of the agreement. BRUNET ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 42. Thus, most awards survive judicial review. See Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 9, at 
341–42. Professor David Horton describes delegation clauses like the one in the RAC Agreement 
as “private procedural rulemaking” that “change arbitration from an alternative to litigation to a 
parallel, private judicial system in which [companies] make the rules.” Horton, supra note 74, at 
465. 
  As section 10 of the FAA provides four exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitral award 
(fraud, arbitrator bias, arbitrator misconduct, and arbitrators exceeding their power), parties 
cannot contract for any additional grounds for vacatur. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; Hall St. Assocs., LLC 
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008). 
 79. See Horton, supra note 74, at 490–91. More disconcerting yet, plaintiffs may not even be 
aware that their contracts include such delegation clauses. Id. at 490. Many contracts incorporate 
by reference the rules of a major arbitral provider like the American Arbitration Association. Id. 
Such rules often empower the arbitrator to rule on his or her own jurisdiction. Id. 
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bargaining power and levels of sophistication.80 Indeed, the FAA’s 
plain language demonstrates that Congress did not intend for it to 
extend to employment contracts. Section 1 states that “nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”81 At the time of the FAA’s enactment, these 
were the only employment relationships subject to federal 
jurisdiction.82 Between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, however, 
Congress passed a number of statutes regulating the workplace, and 
between 1980 and 2005, federal litigation concerning employment 
disputes increased 600 percent.83 Congress needs to amend the FAA 
to reflect the federal government’s more prominent role in the 
employment arena. 
B.  In Employment and Consumer Settings, 
Courts Should Always Hear Arbitrability Challenges  
By eliminating judges’ ability to strike down unconscionable 
arbitration provisions, the Court has abolished an important check on 
companies imposing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in order to 
gain an unfair advantage in disputes. As a result, consumers and 
employees now have more difficulty ensuring that their disputes with 
companies and employers are fairly heard.84 A company has much to 
gain and little to lose from inserting unconscionable provisions in 
standard employment contracts that the Average Joe will, for all 
intents and purposes, be forced to sign. Drafters can make mandatory 
arbitration clauses self-enforcing merely by indicating that an 
 
 80. Historically, businesses did not enter into arbitration agreements with consumers, and the 
legislative history of the FAA shows that Congress did not think the business-consumer setting 
was an appropriate place for arbitration. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 127. 
 81. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 82. Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Voluntary?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 92 
(2009) (statement of Cliff Palefsky, National Employment Lawyers Association) [hereinafter 
Palefsky, Mandatory Binding Arbitration]. 
 83. Lewin, supra note 1, at 26. 
 84. Brief of National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Action as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 12, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 
09-497) [hereinafter Brief of National Consumer Law Center]. For a discussion in support of 
mandatory arbitration, see Jean Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1631, 1653–58 (2005) (explaining that defenses include that employees and consumers 
have better access to arbitration than they have to courts, and that arbitration on a post-dispute 
basis is not feasible). 
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arbitrator will decide challenges to the clause’s validity.85 Companies 
will be “free to impose one-sided terms or select clearly biased 
arbitrators with close ties to the company, secure in the knowledge 
that any challenge to the fairness of arbitration will be decided by the 
arbitrator whose very authority comes from the challenged 
arbitration agreement.”86 
Arbitration has traditionally been agreed to by two knowing 
business entities of presumably comparable strength. Parties to 
employment and consumer contracts, however, almost always have 
unequal bargaining power.87 These employees and consumers are 
often presented with take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion that 
leave little room for negotiation,88 and “judicial review for 
unconscionability operate[d] as a sort of safety valve that ma[de] 
arbitration of consumer and employment disputes palatable.”89 
Judges could take the parties’ relative bargaining power into account 
when deciding whether the parties had knowingly agreed to allow the 
arbitrator to decide if arbitration should proceed. This safety valve 
has been eliminated. 
 
 85. NACA Brief, supra note 65, at 4. NACA argued further that these clauses would be 
“subject to no law whatsoever.” Id. at 6. 
 86. Deepak Gupta, Supreme Court Decides Rent-a-Center v. Jackson: Companies Can 
Delegate Unconscionability Challenges to the Arbitrator, CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 
21, 2010, 4:28 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2010/06/supreme-court-decides-
rentacenter-v-jackson-companies-can-delegate-unconscionability-challenges-to-t.html. 
 87. Statutes often regulate contracts in these settings to prevent overreaching and unfair 
terms precisely because businesses have a history of taking advantage of their superior bargaining 
position. Schwartz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements, supra note 62, at 85; see NACA 
Brief, supra note 65, at 7. 
 88. A recent survey of leading financial services and telecommunications firms found that 
arbitration clauses appear in 77 percent of employment contracts and 93 percent of consumer 
contracts. Horton, supra note 74, at 481 n.242. It is unlikely that so many people knowingly and 
voluntarily gave up their right to go to court. 
  Tellingly, corporations avoid binding arbitration when it applies to them—only 11 
percent of contracts between corporations have arbitration clauses. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS § 1.4 (Supp. 2006). For example, Congress passed the 
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 because franchisees opposed 
mandatory arbitration imposed on them by car manufacturers. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 
179. Ironically, although manufacturers cannot impose arbitration on franchisees because of 
unequal bargaining power, franchisees still can (and do) impose arbitration on their customers. Id. 
 89. Aaron Bruhl, Allocating Power Between Courts and Arbitrators—And Why Scholars of 
Federal Courts Should Care, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 22, 2010, 9:23 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/02/index.html. 
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1.  Unequal Bargaining Power Leads to Employees and 
Consumers Alienating Their Rights Without Consent 
It does not make sense to apply the same rules to contracts 
between the Average Joe and his employer that apply to contracts 
between two sophisticated business parties negotiating at arm’s 
length.90 When the employee is presented with a boilerplate 
employment contract that he must sign as a condition of getting 
hired, it seems unlikely that the employee fairly agreed to arbitration 
or that the employee even understood what he signed.91 This scenario 
stands in stark contrast to a general commercial transaction between 
two businesses, in which both parties are likely to have legal 
representation during the negotiations, are likely to be familiar with 
the contractual clauses, and are more likely to have equal bargaining 
power. Judicial review must be available to ensure that 
unsophisticated employees and consumers are treated fairly and are 
not forced to participate in arbitration to which they did not 
knowingly agree.92 
By its very definition, arbitration eliminates certain rights of 
employees and consumers.93 Form contracts such as the one Jackson 
 
 90. Companies are understandably eager to design their own dispute-resolution processes to 
minimize exposure to liability and avoid public embarrassment. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 
182. 
 91. Indeed, “[i]n the real world, when a lower level employee is provided with a large pile of 
documents . . . , the employee is almost never aware of the existence of that [arbitration] clause, 
much less its meaning[,]” and he is likely reluctant to forego the job over a seemingly petty issue. 
Id. at 323. 
 92. Lack of consent is not the only problem with mandatory employment and consumer 
arbitration. Arbitrators’ decisions can be detrimental to the public, as they “place much less 
pressure on companies to change their practices than court decisions because these decisions are 
confidential, non-binding, and often unwritten.” Brief of National Consumer Law Center, supra 
note 84, at 5. Our public system of justice is vital to deterring harmful conduct and fostering faith 
in the justice system. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 182. Because arbitration proceedings are 
private, they bypass public precedent and public exposure. 
 93. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 144. In addition to eliminating the right to trial, 
arbitration almost certainly eliminates other rights, such as the right to appeal. Id. Further, the 
arbitration clauses imposed on consumers and employees often contain provisions regarding 
discovery, statutes of limitation, permissibility of damages, payment of arbitral fees and costs, 
and the scope of judicial review. Horton, supra note 74, at 480–81. Moreover, arbitrators often 
have structural incentives to rule in favor of the business. Dahlia Lithwick, Justice by the Hour: 
The Supreme Court Tangles with Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2252001/. 
  Proponents suggest that arbitration provides employees with a forum that is cheaper, 
quicker, and more accessible than a court; it also allows employers to reduce their dispute-
resolution costs and pass their savings on to the public. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 149–50. 
However, arbitration can be quite expensive. Arbitrators charge $250 to $450 an hour, and 
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signed require employees to give up constitutional rights as a 
condition of getting a job.94 Such contracts include dense boilerplate 
language that most people do not read and that is nonnegotiable even 
if one did read it.95 For example, the Average Joe would not realize 
that signing an employment contract waives his right to sue even if 
he is the victim of a harm as egregious as discrimination. Jackson 
argued that he did not agree to arbitration, yet he was required to 
arbitrate that very issue. And even if he fully understood the rights 
that RAC required him to give up, what choice did he have? The 
Court should not have held him to the terms of the Agreement absent 
a finding that he had clearly and unmistakably manifested consent. In 
light of Rent-a-Center, drafters are now “quite literally 
empower[ed] . . . to impose arbitration on others without their 
consent.”96 It should not be so easy for people to unknowingly or 
unwillingly give up their constitutional right to judicial redress. 
In addition, because arbitrators’ decisions often do not include 
explanations, arbitration deprives employees of this essential element 
of justice.97 Furthermore, arbitrators are largely unregulated and need 
not apply or even have knowledge of all the provisions of the 
applicable law.98 In short, arbitration is much more than a simple 
forum change that has no impact on substantive rights,99 and Rent-a-
 
arbitration proceedings can carry on for more than 100 hours. Unlike salaried public judges, 
arbitrators have an incentive to drag the process out. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing 
on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 69 (2007) (statement of Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, National Employment 
Lawyers Association) [hereinafter Ventrell-Monsees, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007]. 
 94. Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Public Justice) [hereinafter Bland, Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Agreements]. 
 95. Lawrence Cunningham, Your (Vanishing) “Day in Court,” CONCURRING OPINIONS 
(June 24, 2010, 1:54 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/06/your-vanishing-
day-in-court.html. Only a minute percentage of consumers read form agreements, and even fewer 
actually understand what they have read. Sternlight, supra note 84, at 1648. 
 96. Horton, supra note 74, at 488; see Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in 
Employment Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 519, 529 (2004). 
 97. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the 
New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 43 (2005). In addition, the lack of an explanation 
makes it essentially impossible to challenge an arbitrator’s decision. Bland, Mandatory Binding 
Arbitration Agreements, supra note 94, at 29. 
 98. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 8, 10; Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 9, at 378. 
 99. Palefsky, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 82, at 104. In fact, employees lose 
the ultimate substantive right: the right to have the law enforced. Id.; see also Roma, supra note 
  
Spring 2011]         RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC. V. JACKSON 1285 
Center makes it harder for the Average Joe to seek justice in court to 
enforce even his most fundamental rights.100 
2.  Violation of Employees’ and Consumers’ Due Process 
Judicial review must be available to ensure the fairness and 
integrity of arbitration proceedings, as arbitrators have strong 
incentives to maximize their fees and generate more business for 
themselves.101 There are now tens of thousands of arbitrators in the 
United States, all with potential biases due to their significant 
financial incentives to resolve the question of arbitrability in favor of 
arbitration.102 Because the Rent-a-Center Court denied Jackson 
access to the court system, an arbitrator will rule on “whether the 
terms of the arbitration agreement are fair, in which case he gets to 
decide the case (and get paid for doing so), or unconscionable, in 
which case the matter goes back to court.”103 In this system of for-
profit justice, the arbitrator cannot be a neutral decision maker with 
respect to arbitrability, as one outcome results in his getting paid 
while the other results in his losing business. Companies encourage 
arbitration provisions because arbitrators almost always rule in favor 
of those businesses:104 arbitrators who find in favor of business 
 
96, at 531 (“Arbitrators do not have to receive training in the law; yet they have the important 
responsibility of enforcing statutory rights.”). 
 100. Gans, supra note 67. Indeed, in Jackson’s case, his right to be free from racial 
discrimination in the workplace was at issue. Congress specifically passed section 1981—the 
statute on which Jackson based his claim—to ensure that courts would be open to victims of 
discrimination. Elizabeth Wydra, Forced Arbitration: Proof That We Need a Supreme Court That 
Understands How the Law Affects Ordinary Americans, ACSBLOG (Apr. 28, 2010, 2:52 PM), 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/15990. One might ask if it is ever appropriate to refuse 
discrimination victims access to the courts based on pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Id. 
  Arbitration’s secrecy may appeal to employers looking to avoid the adverse publicity 
associated with public trials on discrimination claims. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. For 
further discussion of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of discrimination claims, see Policy 
Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a 
Condition of Employment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 10, 1997), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html. 
 101. See Brief of National Consumer Law Center, supra note 84, at 3, 19. 
 102. Gaitis, supra note 76. Even if arbitrators try to be impartial, it is hard to rule out the 
possibility that they will at least subconsciously take their own paychecks into account when 
determining a dispute’s arbitrability. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 155. 
 103. Alan B. Morrison, Rent-a-Center = Rent-a-Wreck, ACSBLOG (June 25, 2010, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16426. 
 104. Editorial, Beware the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at 9. Arbitration companies 
have strong incentives to favor corporations because ruling too frequently or too generously 
against corporations may cause them to lose business, as corporations may blackball arbitrators 
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interests will presumably have repeat customers—thereby generating 
greater income. Indeed, arbitrators’ careers and livelihoods depend 
on companies’ repeat business.105 
Due process, however, requires a neutral decision maker. When, 
for example, a judge has any financial interest in a case, he must 
recuse himself regardless of whether the financial interest results in 
actual bias.106 On the other hand, an arbitrator’s financial interest 
nearly always aligns with that of the drafter of the agreement.107 This 
bias—whether actual or only apparent—flies in the face of our 
constitutional due process guarantees. 
C.  Congress Needs to Act 
Congress wrote the FAA as “one-size-fits-all,” and courts have 
interpreted it to reach employees even though employment contracts 
differ from most negotiated deals.108 Some federal and state courts 
are less enthusiastic than the Supreme Court about arbitration, 
especially regarding consumer and employment contracts—yet they 
cannot do anything about it.109 The Court’s pro-arbitration stance thus 
leaves employees with little hope of successfully challenging 
arbitration clauses. As the Court has expanded the scope of FAA 
preemption through cases like Rent-a-Center, only the common law 
of contracts remains to govern arbitration clauses.110 This is not 
enough to protect the Average Joe, as the Court has made it clear that 
challenging arbitration agreements will be very difficult. Therefore, 
Congress must rewrite the rules.111 
 
who rule against them. Bland, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements, supra note 94, at 17–
18. 
 105. Ventrell-Monsees, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, supra note 93, at 69. An employee 
will likely only arbitrate one dispute, whereas a company may arbitrate many. BRUNET ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 145. 
 106. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 107. Brief of the American Association for Justice and AARP as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 37, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497). 
 108. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. 
 109. Bruhl, supra note 89 (“Over the course of the last couple of decades the Supreme Court 
has shut off most avenues for challenging arbitration agreements at the wholesale level—state law 
cannot declare particular fields like consumer transactions off limits from arbitration, courts 
cannot deem arbitration per se violative of public policy, etc. All such arguments are preempted 
by the Federal Arbitration Act.”). 
 110. NACA Brief, supra note 65, at 7. 
 111. Congress has already proven its willingness to change arbitration procedures. The recent 
Wall Street reform bill eliminated mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in mortgages and home 
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Recently, Congress considered the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, which would have excluded employment, consumer, franchise, 
and civil rights disputes from the FAA’s scope.112 It also would have 
taken away arbitrators’ ability to determine the validity and 
enforceability of arbitration agreements in all cases.113 Simple 
awareness of a risk that courts—not arbitrators—could end up 
determining the fairness of arbitration agreements may be all that is 
needed to prevent arbitration-clause drafters from overreaching.114 
The bill’s opponents worried that these restrictions would reduce the 
effectiveness of arbitration as a cost-effective remedy for commercial 
disputes.115 However, the bill would not have eliminated the ability of 
businesses to arbitrate disputes; it would have simply prevented 
companies from using their unfair bargaining power to force 
employees or consumers into arbitration. Furthermore, consumers or 
employees still could have agreed to arbitrate a claim after a dispute 
had arisen. 
CONCLUSION 
Arbitration should occur when circumstances warrant it—for 
example, when parties to a contract clearly and unmistakably agree 
to arbitrate, and both parties understand the consequences. At the 
same time, courts must have the ability to protect weaker parties 
from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration when the parties did not 
clearly and unmistakably agree. Prior to Rent-a-Center, employees 
had the right to go to court and ask judges to find agreements 
 
equity loans and gave the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the ability to preclude 
arbitration of other consumer financial agreements as well. Stacy Johnson, Ready, Set . . . Sue! 
Forced Arbitration Fading, MONEY TALKS NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://www.moneytalksnews.com/2010/08/18/ready-set-sue-forced-arbitration-fading.  
 112. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(b)(1)–(2) (2009). This bill 
prohibits the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration entirely in these contexts (although post-
dispute agreements would still be valid). Less drastic options open to Congress would be to allow 
mandatory pre-dispute resolution only when such pre-dispute agreements meet certain 
requirements or allow states to regulate employment and consumer arbitration. For a proposal in 
line with the former, see Bales & Irion, supra note 6, at 1091–92. 
 113. H.R. 1020 § 2(c). 
 114. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1488 (2008). 
 115. Andrew Ness, Changes Afoot—The Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, KLUWER 
CONSTRUCTION BLOG (Mar. 19, 2010), http://kluwerconstructionblog.com/2010/03/19/changes-
afoot-%E2%80%93-the-proposed-arbitration-fairness-act/. 
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unenforceable under section 2.116 This judicial review weeded out the 
worst abuses while upholding most arbitration agreements.117 Now, 
the judiciary has been relegated to rubber-stamping motions to 
compel arbitration.118 
Courts should not send disputes to arbitration unless parties have 
formed enforceable contracts requiring arbitration of their disputes. 
The Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center has eliminated a very 
important check—judicial review—on mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in the types of contracts average Americans are 
forced to sign every day. Thus, Congress needs to step in to protect 
the Average Joe and restore the FAA to its original purpose of 
encouraging and upholding arbitration clauses in contracts between 
two willing parties. 
 
 
 116. Gupta, supra note 86. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Horton, supra note 70, at 2. 
